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The existence of an inverted U-shaped effect of the relatedness between acquirer and acquired firm on 
the innovative performance subsequent to an acquisition is normally regarded as indicative of the 
existence of a trade-off between exploration and exploitation in external innovation search. We argue 
that acquirers endowed with heterogeneous learning capabilities can alter the shape of the trade-off to 
their favor. In particular, we focus on a notion of industry relatedness that captures the coherence 
between the domains of operation of the acquirer and the acquired firm. Using a longitudinal dataset 
of 1,736 domestic acquisitions in the Netherlands, we show that the heterogeneous learning 
capabilities of the acquirers alter the shape of the inverted-U relationship, according to first- and 
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second-order moderating effects. Our results confirm that learning capabilities by internal R&D and 
by acquisition experience both improve what acquirers can achieve in innovative performance when 
industry relatedness is at the point of balance between exploration and exploitation. In contrast, they 
have opposite implications on the potential losses in innovative performance when industry 
relatedness is outside the point of balance: internal R&D increases the tolerance of the trade-off, 
smoothing out potential innovation losses, whereas acquisition experience reduces it.  
 
 





While the success of related vis-à-vis unrelated acquisitions is a core topic in the Merger & 
Acquisition (M&A) literature, little is known about under which conditions related and 
unrelated acquisitions can lead to success in post-acquisition innovative performance. 
Adopting a learning capabilities approach (Levitt and March, 1988; Zollo and Winter, 2002), 
we define these conditions in terms of the interaction between industry relatedness and the 
heterogeneous learning capabilities of the acquiring firms, due to investments in R&D and 
acquisition experience, and we examine their effects on post-acquisition innovative 
performance. Prior research focuses on the effect of technological relatedness in the context 
of technology acquisitions, and finds that the effect is curvilinear, inverted U-shaped, when 
considering the impact on patented inventions (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; 
Sears and Hoetker, 2014) and market value (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2014) following an 
acquisition. This evidence is interpreted as indicative of the existence of a trade-off between 
the “exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties” (March, 1991, p. 
71), for firms pursing acquisitions as part of their explorative and exploitative search (Phene 
et al., 2012; Van Deusen and Mueller, 1999). Related acquisitions reflect concerns for 
improvement, integration and efficiency (Capron and Mitchell, 2004; Ranft and Lord, 2002), 
which are associated with exploitation (March, 1991). Unrelated acquisitions display 
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Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990), which are associated with exploration (March, 1991). This 
curvilinear relationship sets the boundaries within which acquirers seek to balance 
exploration and exploitation in resource configuration (Greve, 2007). From a capability 
perspective (Bos et al. 2017; Kaul and Wu 2016), however, it is important to understand how 
these boundaries can be modified by the acquiring firms because of their own specific ability 
to benefit from a certain resource configuration pattern, and to translate such configuration 
into superior innovative performance (Prabhu et al., 2005; Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
To fill this gap, we propose that the heterogeneous learning capabilities of the 
acquirers alter the shape of the inverted-U relationship, according to first- and second-order 
moderating effects. In particular, we account for two kinds of capabilities: in active learning 
(or learning by search) as the outcome of in-house R&D, and in passive learning (or learning 
by doing) as the outcome of acquisition experience (Levitt and March, 1988; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). By using data on 1,736 Dutch domestic acquisitions, we show that capabilities 
in active and passive learning help acquirers to shift the coordinates of the point of balance 
between exploration and exploitation to their favor, enhancing the innovative performance 
attainable at the optimal industry relatedness (first-order effect on the vertex of the inverted-
U). We also find that capabilities in active and passive learning have opposite effects on the 
tolerance of the trade-off, as they decrease and increase, respectively, the size of potential 
losses in innovative performance outside the optimal level of industry relatedness (second-
order effect on the focal length of the inverted-U).  
By illustrating these moderating effects, we contribute to the understanding of the 
conditions that shape the relationship between relatedness, capabilities and post-acquisition 
innovative performance. Moreover, we investigate this relationship in a broader context than 
earlier studies. In prior M&A research,  relatedness is defined in terms of proximity between 
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relatedness (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 
2010; Prabhu et al., 2005; Sears and Hoetker, 2014), or between the domains of products and 
markets, as industry or market relatedness (Makri et al. 2010). Proximity is measured along a 
pre-assigned hierarchical system of classification of technologies or sectors (Silverman, 
1999). Conversely, in our study, we measure the degree of relatedness by applying Bryce and 
Winter’s (2009) definition of a general index of industry relatedness, to M&As. This index is 
based on the notion of coherence (Teece et al., 1994), as an expression of the fact that the 
resources basket of one industry matters also in another industry, without having to specify 
the nature of the resource differences. Hence, our index reveals whether an acquisition 
combines coherent domains of activity, regardless of the proximity between the technological 
knowledge and/or markets involved.  
Furthermore, earlier studies consider the effect of technological relatedness on the 
patenting activity of acquiring firms in high-tech sectors, in which acquisitions are likely to 
be motivated by access to technological knowledge (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 
2006; Sears and Hoetker, 2014). Patented inventions are, however, intermediate output and 
imperfect indicators of innovative activities (Pavitt, 1985). In contrast, we consider the direct 
impact of industry relatedness on the sales revenues from innovation, recording innovative 
performance at the end of the entire commercialization process. Our approach allows to 
capture acquisition synergies that originate from access to complementary assets along the 
vertical chain (Puranam et al., 2006) and from diversification in product markets (Cassiman 
et al., 2005), all affecting commercialization (Teece, 1986). In this broader sense, acquisition 
synergies can influence innovation across a wider set of industries, including those with a low 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Exploration, exploitation and the inverted U-shaped relationship 
The critical source of value creation in acquisitions lays in the opportunity to create synergies 
between the parties (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999); these synergies can be achieved in both 
related and unrelated acquisitions (Seth, 1990). Relatedness increases the ‘integration 
potential’ of an acquisition (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Related acquisitions facilitate the 
transfer of resources of one company to another, which is necessary to realize ‘efficiency 
synergies’ through the exploitation of economies of scale and scope in the merged 
organization (Harrison et al., 1991). As for innovation outcomes, efficiency synergies 
originate from both technological and market relatedness (Cassiman et al., 2005). 
Technologically related acquisitions, in which the parties share similar and complementary 
knowledge bases, produce economies of scale and scope in the R&D process, through 
operational improvements and elimination of duplicated efforts  (Cloodt et al., 2006; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Makri et al., 2010). Market related acquisitions can generate 
both economies of scale in the production and distribution of innovative products (Cassiman 
et al., 2005), and economies of scope in R&D and in other activities, such as marketing and 
production, which are functional to the commercialization of innovation (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999).  
Conversely, un-relatedness increases the ‘novelty potential’ of an acquisition. 
Unrelated acquisitions generate ‘unique synergies’ through the recombination of resources 
profiles that are distant and idiosyncratic; their benefits are specific to the companies 
involved or are known only to few companies (Harrison et al., 1991). Hence, they have the 
potential to create resource configurations that are “uniquely valuable” (Barney, 1988) and to 
generate path-breaking change in the acquiring firm (Karim and Mitchell, 2000). Specifically, 
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knowledge, help acquirers build their own innovative capabilities (Arora and Gambardella, 
1990; Graebner et al., 2010). Acquisitions in unrelated product markets give control over 
unfamiliar environments, reducing risks and uncertainty for the acquirer firms (Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002). Furthermore, they can provide access to unique co-specialized 
complementary assets that buyers necessitate for commercializing their own innovations 
(Teece, 1986). Similarly, they can offer novel products to complement the buyer’s own 
assets, and enable expanding the application and use of the buyer’s own resources to 
innovations introduced elsewhere (Puranam et al., 2006).  
In sum, the M&A literature suggests that acquisitions contribute to innovation 
performance through two mechanisms, each one displaying an opposite association with the 
degree of relatedness in resources configurations between the parties involved: (a) relatedness 
increases the ‘integration potential’ of acquisitions and enhances the scope for exploiting 
efficiency synergies in the innovation process; (b) relatedness decreases the ‘novelty 
potential’ of acquisitions and diminishes the scope for exploring unique synergies in the 
innovation process.1 As Haans et al. (2015) point out, this type of framework is a necessary 
condition to generate an inverted-U, when the two latent mechanisms are combined either 
additively or multiplicatively. Extant empirical evidence supports that there is an inverted-U 
relationship in the context of technology acquisitions and of the patenting activities of firms. 
Following a replication logic (Bettis et al., 2014), we test for this curvilinear relationship in a 
broader context, by using Bryce and Winter’s (2009) general index of industry relatedness, 
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The moderating effects of learning capabilities  
In Bryce and Winter’s (2009) definition, applied to M&As, industry relatedness is a structural 
property of the configuration of resources that characterizes the industries in which the 
acquirer and the acquired firm are active. By definition, this is a property specific to the 
combination or pair of industries that are connected in an acquisition. It reflects to what 
extent resources relevant for activities in the industry of the acquired firm are also relevant in 
the industry of the acquirer. Given this industries-specific property of an acquisition deal, we 
explain individual deal-level differences in innovative performance drawing on 
organizational learning theory, based on the heterogeneous learning capabilities of the 
acquiring firms. In particular, we account for the distinction between capabilities in ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’ learning (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Acquisitions can be part of the process of 
‘active learning’ or ‘learning by search’ of firms that deliberately search and accumulate new 
knowledge from various sources both internally and externally to them (Dosi, 1982; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). The rate of active learning depends on the rate of search (Levitt and 
March, 1988), which is influenced by the firm’s own investments in R&D (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Acquisitions also involve a process of ‘passive learning’ or ‘learning by direct 
experience’ (Levitt and March, 1988), because acquirers accumulate expertise through the 
repetition of ‘making an acquisition’. Here, the rate of learning is a function of the experience 
built in performing a focal task and solving problems related to it (Levitt and March, 1988), 
that is, of acquisition experience (Barkema and Schijven, 2008).  
Based on the above considerations, we focus on two acquirer-specific characteristics as 
moderators of the effect of industry relatedness on post-acquisition performance: the size of 
R&D investments and acquisition experience. In particular, we distinguish first- and second-
order moderating effects on the inverted U-shaped relationship, modeled analytically by a 
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without changing its shape. By this effect, the level of industry relatedness that maximizes 
innovative performance, as identified by the vertex of the parabola, changes. This represents 
a variation in the coordinates of the point of balance in the trade-off between exploration and 
exploration. The second-order effect consists of a change in the shape of the inverted-U, as 
the curvature of the parabola becomes flatter or steeper. By this effect, the size of the 
potential losses in innovative performance, which are consequent to departing from the 
optimal (maximizing) level of industry relatedness, changes. This represents a variation in the 
tolerance of the trade-off between exploration and exploitation to possible departures from 
the point of balance. 
 
Acquirer’s in-house R&D investments 
In-house R&D activities contribute to the knowledge basis firms draw upon in their process 
of active learning, and create a pool of opportunities for innovation internally to the 
organization (Levitt and March, 1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982). In this process, pairing 
internal search with external search enables firms to benefit from complementarities and 
synergies in resources and capabilities, which enhance innovative performance (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006). By investing in internal R&D firms develop a basis of prior knowledge 
and problem-solving skills, which increase their ‘absorptive capacity’: their ability to 
recognize the value of knowledge produced elsewhere and to effectively assimilate and apply 
it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, p. 128). A greater absorptive capacity increases the returns 
from an internal search in the presence of external search, and vice versa (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006, p. 76). Based on the absorptive capacity argument, earlier studies conclude 
that a larger size of the knowledge basis prior to an acquisition positively influence 
innovative performance post-acquisition (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006).2 
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expenditures also moderate the effect of industry relatedness. Larger R&D investments imply 
a larger and richer, more diversified, pool of knowledge and expertise within the company 
(Levitt and March, 1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, acquirers investing more in 
R&D are more likely to own prior knowledge that can assess and exploit outside resources 
relevant in industry domains normally unrelated to the industry in which the acquirers are 
active. Hence, R&D investments enhance the integration potential of an acquisition. As 
emphasized (Haans et al., 2015), to have an inverted-U effect it is not sufficient that the 
independent variable exerts both positive and negative effects. It is also necessary that the 
positive effect is greater than the negative effect when the independent variable is low, and 
vice versa when the independent variable is high. In our framework, this condition implies 
that the integration effect (a) is dominant over the novelty effect (b) when industry 
relatedness is low. This assumption is consistent with the notion in the M&A literature that, 
in a situation of over-exploration (too low relatedness), the gains in integration potential from 
increasing relatedness outbalance the marginal losses due to reduced novelty (Capron and 
Mitchell, 2004; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). As a consequence, the enhanced integration 
potential of acquisitions carried out by acquirers investing in R&D is more impactful at low 
levels of industry relatedness (below the optimum). Hence, R&D-investing acquirers are in a 
better position to exploit industry-unrelated acquisitions of higher novelty potential. We 
characterize this as a first-order moderating effect: larger R&D investments enable the 
acquiring firm to achieve a higher (maximum) level of post-acquisition innovative 
performance at a lower (optimal) level of industry relatedness. This effect translates into a 
shift of the coordinates of the point of balance between exploration and exploitation (i.e. the 
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HYPOTHESIS 1a: The acquirer’s prior R&D expenditure moderates the inverted-U 
relationship between industry relatedness and post-acquisition innovative performance, by 
shifting the point of balance towards lower industry relatedness, and higher innovative 
performance. 
 
When acquirers fail to choose an acquisition target from one optimally related industry, 
they face losses regarding the outcomes they could have achieved post-acquisition had they 
made the optimal choice, because of either over-exploitation or over-exploration. R&D 
expenditures can help to mitigate such losses. By investing in R&D, firms engage in a 
process of internal search characterized by longitudinal uncertainty, largely driven by 
experimentation and trial-and-error learning, with partly random outcomes (Dosi, 1988). 
Accordingly, larger R&D investments are likely to produce greater variance in the search 
outcomes, and in the range of possible resources combinations and potential uses of these 
resources (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Thus, with over-exploration, acquirers with larger 
R&D investments can rely on a greater ‘combinatorial potential’ of their resources basis 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Furthermore, R&D activities produce ‘discovery efficiencies’. 
Because of experimentation and trial-and-error learning, R&D active firms discover new 
resources, which introduce new resource combinations and reveal further resource uses  (Ng, 
2007). Hence, firms can rely on a greater variety of options for finding productive 
combinations and uses of ‘excessively’ unrelated resources. To the other end, with over-
exploitation, R&D active acquirers can compensate the costs of excessive resources overlap 
because their innovative efforts can benefit from greater market power, through resources 
aggregation, and from spreading R&D costs across a larger volume of activity (Cassiman et 
al., 2005). Based on these arguments, we assume that R&D investments lower the potential 
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industry relatedness. This second-order moderating effect of R&D investments entails greater 
tolerance in the trade-off between exploration and exploitation to departures from the point of 
balance; the effect is represented by a flatter curvature of the inverted-U.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: The acquirer’s prior R&D expenditure moderates the inverted-U 
relationship between industry relatedness and post-acquisition innovative performance by 




The effect of acquisition experience on post-acquisition performance has been widely studied 
in the M&A literature, with a focus on financial performance, and mixed results (Barkema 
and Schijven, 2008). Some observe that while experience and learning-by-doing can 
positively affect post-acquisition performance through a faster and smoother acquisition 
integration process (Hitt et al., 1998), experience can also create negative transfer effects 
when old knowledge applies to new domains (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). The main 
conclusion from the extant literature is that a direct effect of acquisition experience is likely 
to be not significant, instead, the effect is nonlinear (U-shaped), dynamic, and contingent to 
the domain of application (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Accordingly, firms go through an 
incremental learning path: early in the learning curve, little (but not too much) experience 
facilitates learning in related domains. Then, over time and after successive acquisitions firms 
build a large enough and diversified experience pool that enables effective learning in 
unrelated domains (Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). The 
existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship implies, as a necessary condition, that the 
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Hence, the moderating effect of experience, increasing integration potential, will be most 
relevant for innovation when industry relatedness is low, while it will be marginal when 
industry relatedness is high. We can then conclude that the innovation outcomes of 
acquisitions improve when firms draw on a sufficiently large pool of experience to facilitate 
the integration process of resources from unrelated domains, of greater novelty potential. 
Hence, the first-order moderating effect of acquisition experience is to increase post-
acquisition innovative performance from unrelated industry domains. This effect leads to a 
shift of the coordinates of the point of balance between exploration and exploitation towards 
lower industry relatedness and higher post-acquisition innovative performance.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2a: Acquirer’s M&A experience moderates the inverted-U relationship 
between industry relatedness and post-acquisition innovative performance, by shifting the 
point of balance towards lower industry relatedness and higher innovative performance. 
 
As for the second-order moderating effect, and contrary to the assumption made for 
R&D, we argue that acquisition experience can accentuate the potential losses in post-
acquisition innovative performance, when acquisitions do not fulfill the optimal level of 
industry relatedness. Active learning and passive learning generate different types of 
capabilities to adapt and change, which Ng (2007) differentiates as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
dynamic capabilities. Learning by experience, or passive learning, enhances the capability to 
solve problems connected to a specific task. By repeating the task, firms accumulate 
experience about how to use their resources to carry out the task more proficiently and 
effectively; they accumulate ‘resource use experience’(Ng, 2007). Resource use experience in 
‘how to make an acquisition’ generates acquisition capabilities, which are stored and retained 
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the codification of knowledge in manuals, systems and tools, and the establishment of 
dedicated acquisition units (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Furthermore, in passive learning, 
experience and ‘problemistic search’ (Cyert and March, 1963) lead to the discovery of new 
uses to existing resources, which are closely related to the firm’s prior experience of resource 
use (Ng, 2007). In contrast, in active learning, experimentation and ‘combinatorial search’ 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2004) lead to the discovery of new resources, which reveal further 
new uses. Thus, experience reinforce existing practices and routines that were developed 
based on prior successes and failures, creating path-dependency and possible bias towards 
solutions that already proved to be successful (Levitt and March, 1988; Zahra and George, 
2002). Because of the emphasis on current strengths and routine development, experience 
favors exploitation over-exploration (Greve, 2007). Thus, while active learning expands the 
search space, passive learning may limit it. Consistent with this argument, Hayward (2002) 
observes that learning by experience is most effective when newly acquired resources are 
optimally related, neither too similar nor too dissimilar, to prior acquisitions (itself an 
inverted U-shaped effect). In summary, we conclude that by constraining the capabilities of 
acquirers to adapt and change, in response to situations in which the resources profiles are not 
optimally configured, acquisition experience leads to greater potential losses outside the point 
of balance between exploration and exploitation. Hence, the second-order moderating effect 
of experience is to lower the tolerance of the trade-off; the curvature of the inverted-U 
becomes narrower.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2b: Acquirer’s M&A experience moderates the inverted-U relationship 
between industry relatedness and post-acquisition innovative performance, by increasing the 
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METHODS 
Data sources 
We use data from the Netherlands General Business Register (ABR)3 and the Community 
Innovation Surveys (CIS) on firms operating in the Netherlands. Both datasets are managed 
by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The ABR contains data at the level of 
the business legal unit for the population of firms registered for fiscal purposes in the 
Netherlands and includes economic and demographic information. The CIS is a European 
Union (EU) survey aimed at gathering harmonized data on the innovative activities and 
performance of firms, carried out by the member Nations under Eurostat coordination. CIS 
data and the derived indicators of innovation activities and performance have been used 
extensively in studies on the economics and management of innovation (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2002; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010; Love and Roper, 2002; Mairesse and Mohnen, 
2002). The Dutch CIS is conducted every two years; each wave covers the three-year period 
before the survey year. Seven CIS waves, from 1994 to 2008, were available for this study: 
CIS 2 (1994–1996), CIS2.5 (1996–1998), CIS3 (1998–2000), CIS3.5 (2000–2002), CIS4 
(2002–2004), CIS 4.5 (2004–2006), and CIS 5 (2006–2008). The CIS is administered by the 
CBS to a random sample of firms extracted from those registered in the ABR (firms' 
population), and stratified according to firm size, region, and industry. The CIS samples are 
designed to reduce biases and distortions in the representation of the firms' population.  
 
Sample 
For the construction of our sample we first identified in the ABR all M&A deals, 29,388, that 
took place in the Dutch market over the period 1997–2005. Second, from the same ABR data, 
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acquirer and the acquired firm at the date of the acquisition, as observed in the ABR. Third, 
we matched the above demographic data from the ABR with firm-level innovation data from 
the CIS using the firms' identification code provided internally by the Statistical Office, as 
follows. First, for each acquiring firm, we gathered the data on ‘pre-acquisition’ innovative 
activities from the CIS wave immediately before the date of the acquisition. Second, for the 
same acquiring firm, we added data on the ‘post-acquisition’ innovative performance using 
the CIS wave that follows the year of acquisition. Neither the "prior" nor the "following" CIS 
waves include the acquisition year. In view of the timeline of the CIS waves, the post-
acquisition innovative performance is observed after an integration period ranging from 3 to 
5 years. For instance, if the acquisition happened in 2005 (the last year in our sample), a 
typical data sequence would contain (i) demographic data (firm age, size and sector) 
extracted from the ABR in the year of acquisition, i.e. 2005; (ii) pre-acquisition innovative 
activities and performance data extracted from the CIS wave immediately preceding the 
acquisition, i.e. 2002-2004 and (iii) post-acquisition innovative performance data extracted 
from the CIS wave following the year of acquisition, i.e. 2006-2008. Each CIS wave provides 
the sales revenues from innovative products and services, as reported at the end of the 3rd 
year of the wave. Hence, for the same example as above, the ‘pre-acquisition’ innovative 
performance (measured by innovative sales revenues) is calculated in the year 2004; the 
‘post-acquisition’ innovative performance is calculated in 2008, three years after the M&A 
deal was concluded.  
The outcome was a final sample of 1,736 domestic acquisition deals realized between 
1997 and 2005 involving manufacturing, service, and construction firms. The reduction in the 
sample size from the initial number of M&As is because not all the firms involved in M&As, 
as identified in the population of registered firms (ABR), are included in the samples 
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actually perform an acquisition, given that our unit of observation is the acquisition deal; 
therefore, our results are not generalizable to the entire firms' population, but concern only 
those firms that engage in acquisitions. 
 
A model of moderating effects to a curvilinear relationship 
The existence of a curvilinear relationship between an indicator of performance and an index 
of relatedness is generally formalized using a parabolic function, such as:  
                                                              y = ax2 + bx + c                                                       (1) 
The existence of an inverted-U is equivalent to the condition a < 0. To test separately for 
first- and second-order moderating effects, we use the two analytical properties that fully 
identify the shape of the parabola: (i) the vertex, defining the position of the parabola on the 
xy-plane, with coordinates: 
                                                                                                        (2) 
and (ii) the focal length, defining the center of the parabola, i.e. the distance between the 
vertex and the focus, measured on the axis of symmetry of the parabola. The focal length 
reflects how steep or flat is the curvature and is expressed as: 
                                                      (3) 
where |a| is the absolute value of the coefficient a. High values of the coefficient a imply low 
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A first-order moderating effect of a variable z on the curvilinear relationship can be 
introduced in the form of a variation in the linear coefficient of equation (1), with the new 
coefficient set to (b+δz). This is equivalent to assuming that, if the value of z changes, the 
vertex (and position) of the parabola shifts without changing its curvature, since the latter is 
determined by the focal length which is a function exclusively of the parameter a. 
Specifically, with an inverted-U in a model with only linear interaction terms, the parabola 
shifts towards the left-hand side if the coefficient of the interaction term is negative, i.e. δ < 0 
(the x-coordinate decreases), and toward the right-hand side if it is positive, i.e. δ > 0 (the x-
coordinate increases). Accordingly, Hypotheses 1a and 2a, which entail a shift of the 
coordinates of the point of balance between exploration and exploitation towards lower 
industry relatedness, are equivalent to δ < 0 in a model with only linear interaction terms, 
which maintains the curvature of the inverted-U constant. 
A second-order moderating effect to the curvilinear relationship consists in a change 
in the parabola's curvature, while holding the position of the vertex constant. We formulate 
this effect as a variation in the quadratic coefficient of equation (1), with the new coefficient 
set to (a + γz2). This has the effect of changing the focal length, and the curvature of the 
parabola, according to equation (3). Under an inverted-U shape, an increase in the moderating 
variable z will increase the focal length and flatten the curvature, if the coefficient of the 
quadratic interaction term is positive (γ > 0). Conversely, it will reduce the focal length and 
narrow the curvature if the coefficient is negative (γ < 0). Hence, Hypothesis 1b of greater 
tolerance of the exploration-exploitation trade-off with R&D activities is equal to γ > 0. 
Hypothesis 2b of lesser tolerance with acquisition experience, is equal to γ < 0. The complete 
model is:4  
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We can observe innovative sales revenues only for firms that introduce new products or 
services. Estimating a standard regression model on the subset of firms for which we can 
measure innovative sales leads to the risk of sample selection bias. Specifically, in our 
setting, sample selection may emerge because of "incidental truncation" (Certo et al., 2016, p. 
8; Wooldridge, 2010, p. 777) of our data. Incidental truncation occurs because we are able to 
observe our dependent variable, innovative sales revenues, only for firms that do introduce 
new or significantly improved products (and services) subsequent to an acquisition, while the 
value of the dependent variable is missing for those firms that do not introduce product 
innovations. In other words, the probability of inclusion of an acquisition deal (our unit of 
observation) in the estimation sample (i.e. the probability that the acquisition resulted in an 
innovation) is affected by unobservable variables. Idiosyncratic capabilities may influence 
the choice to engage in innovative activities and the ability to complete an innovation project, 
and therefore the probability to be included in the estimation sample, as well as the level of 
post-acquisition sales revenues from innovation. 
To mitigate this problem, we apply a two-stage Heckman model (Heckman, 1979), 
widely used to control for sample selection bias in studies of innovation performance 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002). Specifically, we apply the 
selection equation (Probit regression) of the first stage of the Heckman model to estimate the 
probability that an acquisition deal enters the sample on which we have predicted firms' 
innovation sales. Through this first stage, we obtain the inverse Mill’s ratio (λ), which is 
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correction procedure. The inverse Mill’s ratio is a proxy of the sample selection effect 
because of unmeasured firm innovative capabilities, a component that otherwise would be 
omitted and leading to inconsistent estimators.  
The ‘exclusion restrictions’ in the Heckman 1st stage estimator require that at least 
one independent variable in the selection equation, modeling the probability that the 
acquisition resulted in product innovations, is unrelated (orthogonal) to the volume of sales 
realized from the innovation after the acquisition, which constitutes the dependent variable of 
the performance equation in the 2nd stage of the Heckman model (Certo et al., 2016; 
Wooldridge, 2010). We use as exclusion restrictions the information from the CIS on the 
types of obstacles to innovation faced by firms (Cefis, 2010). The CIS asks all respondents to 
indicate whether they experienced obstacles that prevented innovative activities or projects 
from starting, of three kinds: (i) financial constraints, (ii) lack of qualified personnel and 
information about the technology, and (iii) lack of market information. Earlier studies based 
on CIS data show that the obstacles to innovation are ‘perceived’ by companies as 
constraints, but in fact do not discourage companies from innovating (Veugelers and 
Cassiman, 1999). Nevertheless, the perception of obstacles influences firms’ decisions about 
their innovation strategies, such as the choice between producing a technology internally and 
sourcing it externally (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). Hence, the perception of obstacles to 
innovation is likely to influence the innovation strategy of the acquirer, and whether the 
acquisition will result in the introduction of new products. It is also reasonable to assume, 
however, that the perceived (rather than actual) obstacles to innovation are not direct 
determinants of the level of innovative sales revenues that acquirers can achieve following 
the acquisition; these revenues will depend on the capabilities necessary to successfully 
commercialize the innovation (Teece, 1986). To test the validity of our exclusion restrictions, 
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restrictions in the performance equation. The coefficients of these regressors, when 
controlling for the occurrence of a new product/service introduction, are statistically non-
significant, thus supporting the assumption that the obstacles to innovation are largely 
orthogonal to post-acquisition innovative sales revenues.5 
 
Differences among acquirers in the innovative sales revenues following an acquisition 
may originate unobservable heterogeneity, which produces systematic and persistent 
asymmetries in innovative performance. This leads to a problem of omitted variables in the 
error term of the regression model, and consequently to inconsistent estimators. Because past 
innovative performance is a major predictor of future innovative performance (Geroski et al., 
1997) due to the cumulative nature of the innovation process (Dosi, 1988),  one way to 
attenuate this problem and to control for firm-level fixed effects is to introduce an 
autoregressive component (Bettis et al., 2014). Hence, we add the lagged value of the 
dependent variable (i.e. the acquirers ‘pre-acquisition’ innovation sales in the CIS wave 
preceding the acquisition) to the right-hand side of the performance equation. Acquiring 
firms with superior idiosyncratic innovative capabilities are likely to perform persistently 
better than others, before and after the acquisition, as for example observed in the number of 
patents produced (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006).  
 
Dependent variables 
In the first stage of the Heckman model, we model the probability for the acquiring firm to 
innovate after the acquisition, using as the dependent variable a dummy indicating whether 
the firm introduced new or significantly improved products/services. In the second stage, we 
model the post-acquisition innovative performance measured by the firm’s sales originating 
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distinguish each innovation measure according to the degree of novelty, based on whether the 
products and services are (a) improved or new to the firm (but already available to 
competitors), or (b) new to the market. It should be noted that a firm can be an innovator 
according to the dummy variable definition while realizing innovative sales revenues equal to 
zero if the product has not yet achieved successful commercialization in the market. In all 
specifications, we use the total sales revenues from innovation, in logarithms, instead of the 
percentage on the total sales. The advantage is that sales revenues measure the overall extent 
of commercial success of the innovation (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). As well, an increase in 
sales revenues can be attributed more directly to the innovative activities of the firm, while a 
relative increase in the percentage of innovative sales may be due to declining sales of other 
product offerings (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). From an econometric point of view, using 
total revenues offers more precise estimates because based on a continuous variable which, 
different from a percentage, is not affected by truncation.  
 
Independent variables  
Industry relatedness. Our measure of industry relatedness is adapted from the index proposed 
by Teece et al. (1994). We consider each acquisition event to identify the co-occurrence of 
the industry of the acquired firm, considered as the source of resource transfer, and the 
industry of the acquiring firm as its destination. We then calculate the relatedness index by 
comparing the number of co-occurrences across all acquisitions, oij, observed between the 
industry (i) of the acquirer and the industry (j) of the acquired firm, and the number that 
would have been expected in randomly occurring pairs. Thus, the relatedness index ρij is 
defined as: ρij = (oij - µij) / σij , where μij and σij are the mean and standard deviation of 
randomly distributed pairs, which are best represented by a hypergeometric distribution 
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after linear transformation to assume only positive values, according to the expression:  
Relatij = ln {1 + [ρij + |min (ρij)| ]}. 
This index is particularly suited to representing relatedness in resource profiles (Bryce 
and Winter, 2009; Speckbacher et al., 2015). Because the index is calculated as the frequency 
of co-occurring industry codes across actual acquisitions, it reflects the existence of 
connections (or coherence) between the resource profiles of industries, irrespective of their 
distance in a pre-defined hierarchical ordering of industry codes. Furthermore, in our 
application, the index is unidirectional, since it accounts for the source and destination of the 
connection established with an acquisition. Hence, the degree of industry relatedness can vary 
between the acquirer-acquired pair of industries (i, j) and the acquirer-acquired pair of 
industries (j, i). We calculate the index on the populations of acquisitions completed in the 
Dutch market over the period 1980-2005 (36,375 deals), as identified through the ABR 
dataset. For the entire set of industries at 3-digit level of the NACE classification, we obtain 
204 × 204 combinations of acquirer and acquired industries. 
Moderating variables. The first moderating variable is the acquirer’s R&D internal 
spending. Cloodt et al. (2006) find a significant negative effect of R&D expenditures on the 
patenting output subsequent an acquisition, while the same effect is not statistically 
significant in the study by Ahuja and Katila (2001). Conversely, Makri et al. (2010) observe a 
significant positive effect of R&D intensity on the quality and quantity of patents following 
acquisition. In the CIS definition, the internal R&D spending comprises all the expenditures 
related to R&D performed by the firm’s own personnel. It also includes the costs of 
acquisition of hardware/software and new machinery, market research aimed directly at the 
market introduction of new products or services, and R&D personnel training. We draw this 
variable from the CIS wave before the acquisition year. It is then normalized and entered the 
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(Makri et al., 2010). Because of companies who do not carry out R&D and the skewness of 
the distribution, we add 1 and transform in logarithm. The second moderator is the acquirer’s 
acquisition experience, which, from the ABR data, we can measure by the total number of 
acquisitions. Also this variable is transformed in logarithm.  Makri et al. (2010) find a 
positive statistically significant effect of acquisition experience on invention quantity 
following an acquisition, while the effect is not significant for invention quality and novelty.  
Control variables. In the analysis, we include several factors that can influence post-
acquisition innovative performance. Large and established firms use acquisitions of small and 
young firms as the means to acquire novel technologies and resources (Granstrand and 
Sjölander, 1990; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008). Hence, to control for the relative size (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Makri et al., 2010; Sears and Hoetker, 2014) and 
relative age of the parties involved, we include, for both the acquirer and the acquired firm, 
the number of employees (as a measure of firm size) and the number of years between the 
date of first registration of the firm into the ABR and the date of the acquisition (as a measure 
of firm age), in logarithms. Sectoral differences in the knowledge environment or 
technological regime in which acquirers and acquired firms operate (Breschi et al., 2000; 
Pavitt, 1984) can also affect post-acquisition innovative performance (Cloodt et al., 2006; 
Makri et al., 2010). To control for sectoral differences, we introduce dummy variables for the 
four categories of technological intensity defined by the Eurostat aggregation of industrial 
sectors at the 3-digit NACE level grouped as follows: i) high-tech and medium-high 
technology manufacturing; ii) low-tech and medium-low technology manufacturing; iii) 
knowledge-intensive services (KIS); iv) less knowledge-intensive services (LKIS).  In the 
first stage of the Heckman model, we include only the attributes of the acquirer as control 
variables of the probability that the acquirer innovates post-acquisition. In the second stage, 
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post-acquisition innovative sales. In all models, we include dummy variables per calendar 
year (Ahuja and Katila, 2001), from 1997 to 2004.  
 
RESULTS 
Table I presents the descriptive statistics and the Pearson’s correlation r. The low values of r 
between the independent variables, and the acceptable variance inflation factor (VIF) 
statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not a problem in our analysis. Table II describes the 
sample. 
 
Table III reports the estimates of the probability that the acquiring firm introduces new or 
significantly improved products/services after the acquisition (the selection equation or 1st 
stage), using as the dependent variable both indicators of post-acquisition innovation: new-to-
the-firm innovation (model 1), and new-to-the-market innovation (model 2). For both 
indicators, the probability to innovate post-acquisition is higher for the acquirers that, before 
the acquisition, experienced obstacles to innovation in the form of lack of knowledge and 
market uncertainty but did not experience obstacles to innovation in the form of financial 
constraints.  
 
The coefficients of the performance equation (2nd stage) are reported for the sales revenues of 
new-to-the-firm products (Table IV: model 1, 2 and 3) and of new-to-the-market products 
(Table IV: model 1a, 2a and 3a). Models 1 and 1a account only for the direct effects and 
include the square value of the industry relatedness index to test for the inverted-U shape of 
the curve, in a replication logic. As for the control variables, we find that post-acquisition 
innovative performance is positively influenced by the acquirer’s size, and in the case of 
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autoregressive term is not statistically significant for new-to-the-market innovations, 
indicating that for products of greater novelty (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014) revenues are 
less persistent and more unpredictable over time.  
 
 
The coefficient of the square term of the relatedness index is negative and statistically 
significant, supporting the well-known inverted U-shaped curve, a < 0 in equation (1). While 
the signs of the coefficients of relatedness and its square term are invariant across the model 
specifications, the absolute sizes are always higher for new-to-the-market innovation (model 
1a) than for new-to-the-firm innovation (model 1). To assess the overall effect of these 
differences, Table V reports the vertex coordinates and focal length of the estimated parabola 
for models 1 and 1a on the first row. This shows that, for new-to-the-market innovations, the 
vertex of the parabola, with coordinates (x=3.24, y=8.64), is positioned towards higher levels 
of sales revenues compared to the vertex of the parabola, with coordinates (x=3.22, y=5.85), 
for new-to-the-firm innovations, at approximately the same level of industry relatedness. As 
for the focal length of the parabola, this is smaller for new-to-the-market innovation (0.29) 
than for new-to-the-firm innovation (0.53). This suggests that while post-acquisition 
innovative performance at the optimal level of industry relatedness is higher for products of 
greater novelty, at the same time, losses in innovative performance when deviating from the 
optimal level of relatedness are also more significant (the curvature of the inverted-U is 
narrower). Thus, for greater novelty in product innovation, industry relatedness can more 
easily turn out to be too high or too low to achieve post-deal success. Conversely, for new-to-
the-firm innovations, the level of post-acquisition innovative performance at the optimal level 
of industry relatedness is lower, but the outcome is less sensitive to deviations from the 
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in industry relatedness for post-acquisition performance is higher for less novel product 
innovations. 
 
To test for first- and second-order moderating effects of the acquirer’s internal R&D, we add 
the linear and quadratic interaction terms of the variable R&D intensity with the relatedness 
index, in the two model formulations, for new-to-the-firm innovation sales (model 2) and 
new-to-the-market innovation sales (model 2a).  In both models, we observe that the 
estimated coefficient of the linear interaction term is negative and statistically significant, 
while the estimated coefficient of the quadratic interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. Last, we add the interaction terms with acquisition experience, obtaining the 
complete models 3 for new-to-the-firm innovation sales, and 3a for new-to-the-market 
innovation sales. In both models, the coefficients of the interaction terms with R&D intensity 
remain largely invariant as compared to the previous estimates of models 2 and 2a. Overall, a 
variation in R&D expenditure has the effect of changing both the position of the curve (the 
vertex) and the shape of the curve (the focal length). To visualize these effects, we plot the 
performance-relatedness curve for high and low levels of the acquirer’s R&D expenditure, 
for new-to-the-firm (Figure 1a) and new-to-the-market innovation sales (Figure 1b). In both 
cases, the inverted-U curve shifts to the left hand-side for a higher level of the acquirer’s 
R&D expenditure. This is also confirmed by the variations in the vertex coordinates, reported 
in Table V for the complete model (model 3 and 3a).6 Specifically, for new-to-the-firm 
innovation sales, the vertex coordinates move from (x=2.88, y=5.33) to (x=1.64, y=5.56), 
towards higher values of innovative performance and lower industry relatedness, with 
increasing R&D. For new-to-the-market innovation, the vertex coordinates shift from 
(x=3.24, y=7.42) to (x=2.93, y=7.36), towards marginally lower innovative performance, and 
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interaction term, the curvature of the parabola changes: the focal length increases from 1.48 
to 2.30 for new-to-the-firm innovation and from 0.61 to 0.71 for new-to-the-market 
innovation. This implies that at higher levels of R&D expenditures the curvilinear 
relationship becomes flatter. Hence, acquirers investing in internal R&D more intensively are 
able to balance exploration and exploitation in external search by acquisition at a lower level 
of industry relatedness, somewhat increasing post-acquisition innovative performance, 
overall consistent with Hypothesis 1a. In view of their internal R&D, acquirers also benefit of 
greater tolerance should they fail to achieve such balance, supporting Hypothesis 1b.  
 
As for the moderating effects of acquisition experience, the coefficient of the linear 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient of the quadratic 
interaction terms is negative and statistically significant, in the complete Models 3 and 3a of 
Table IV. It is worth noting that in the complete model for new-to-the-firm innovation sales 
(model 3), the direct effect of industry relatedness and its square term are no longer 
statistically significant. These are the values of the parameters a and b in equation (4), and 
capture the (conditional) effects of X and X2 on Y when the moderating variable Z is equal to 
zero (Brambor et al., 2006). Their interpretation is different from the ‘average’ or 
unconditional effects of X and X2 on Y in the model without interactions terms, i.e. a and b of 
equation (1), both statistically significant. In this case, these results indicate that the 
(conditional) effect of industry relatedness cannot be considered as an inverted U-shaped 
conditionally on R&D and acquisition experience being both equal to zero, while it follows 













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
As shown in Figure 2, for a higher level of acquisition experience, the parabola shifts 
towards the left hand-side, with the vertex moving towards a lower value of industry 
relatedness, and a higher maximum value of innovative performance.7 The vertex coordinates 
change from (x=4.51, y=5.40) to (x=2.72, y=6.70) for new-to-the-firm innovations, with 
increasing acquisition experience, and from (x=3.90, y=7.23) to (x=2.81, y=8.23) for new-to-
the-market innovations (Table V). As for the focal length, this decreases from 1.31 to 0.38 for 
new-to-the-firm innovations, and from 0.58 to 0.27 for new-to-the-market innovations. 
Hence, the curvature of the inverted-U becomes narrower with acquisition experience. 
Accordingly, more experienced acquirers are potentially able to attain a higher level of 
innovative performance in less related acquisitions (supporting Hypothesis 2a), but they also 
risk of being more adversely affected if the acquisition deviates from the optimal level of 
industry relatedness (supporting Hypothesis 2b). This is consistent with the consideration that 
the effect of experience is neither fully positive nor fully negative. As a form of passive 
learning, acquisition experience enables and reduces risks in selecting and integrating 
acquisition targets (shifting the position of the curve favorably), but may also generate 
rigidities because of established routines, when failing to achieve the ‘perfect match’ in 
target-acquirer resource configuration (lowering the tolerance of the curve).    
 
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
To validate whether the estimated relationships reflect the underlying mechanisms, which 
have been assumed to operate in the innovation process of firms, we split the analysis in two 
samples. Specifically, we distinguish between firms active in High-tech and Low-tech 
industries. We expect the hypothesized mechanisms would be stronger in more technological 
intense environments, in which innovation and organizational renewal are more likely to 
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when splitting the sample between firms active in High-tech industries (Table VIa) and in 
Low-tech industries (Table VIb.8 Table VIa shows that, in High-tech firms, overall the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between innovative performance and industry relatedness still 
holds; the estimates of the coefficients of the interaction terms are consistent in statistical 
significance, and reinforce the size of the significant coefficients, as compared to the original 
estimates for the entire sample. In contrast, in Low-tech firms, effect of industry relatedness 
on innovative performance is mostly not statistically significant. The comparison shows 
systematic differences between High-Tech and Low-Tech sectors, suggesting that our 
assumed mechanisms are typical of High-tech industries, in which corporate acquisitions are 
more likely motivated by technological innovation.  
 
Finally, to check whether our results are robust to the econometric method used, we 
estimate the innovation performance equation, as specified previously, using the GMM 
estimator (2SLS) and instrumenting the lagged value of the dependent variable (i.e. the 
acquirer's innovation sales in the years preceding acquisition). We model the instrumented 
variable using the same variables we include in the selection equation of the Heckman model: 
the innovation obstacles, the acquirer's sectors and time dummies. The Hansen-Sargan tests 
show that the instruments used are valid ones (the J statistics and its p-value are reported in 
the low part of Table VII). As shown in Table VII, the GMM estimates are quite consistent 
with the estimates we obtained using the two-stage Heckman model. The magnitude and the 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study enriches our understanding of the interdependence between capabilities, 
relatedness and post-acquisition innovative performance. Specifically, we illustrate the 
conditions that shape the effect of relatedness on post-acquisition innovative, from a learning 
capability perspective. Our results show that the acquirer’s capabilities in active and passive 
learning moderate the shape of the relationship between industry relatedness and post-
acquisition innovative performance, according to distinctive first- and second- order 
moderating effects. 
The extant literature has highlighted that the effect of technological relatedness on 
post-acquisition innovative performance is curvilinear, according to an inverted-U shape  
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Sears and Hoetker, 2014). From a replication 
logic, our results confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship in a more general context, when 
considering the effect of industry relatedness on post-acquisition innovative performance, 
measured by the sales revenues from innovation. As Ahuja and Katila (2001) point out, a 
limitation of prior research is that by using patents, as intermediate and imperfect indicators 
of innovative output, they do not capture the economic returns of inventive activities. More 
recent studies in this research stream use financial indicators to capture value creation, either 
the price paid for the acquired firm (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2014) or the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the acquirer’s stock (Sears and Hoetker, 2014). Regarding financial 
indicators, however, sales revenues from innovation represents a more direct expression of 
the commercial success of an innovation (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). Furthermore, while 
extant definitions of relatedness are based on the proximity or overlap in the contents of the 
knowledge bases (Makri et al., 2010), our definition is based on inter-business coherence 
(Teece et al., 1994), which is consistent with a resource-based notion of relatedness 
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captures the connections between the resource configurations that matter in different 
industries, regardless of their specific contents (Bryce and Winter, 2009). Overall, our study 
extends the technology-based research on relatedness, by accounting for the end outcomes of 
the overall innovation process and for the possible synergies originating from access to 
complementary assets and to product markets, which can influence the commercialization 
and sales revenues of innovations (Cassiman et al., 2005; Puranam et al., 2006). Thus, our 
findings are important for evaluating the contribution of acquisitions to value creation, 
generated throughout the innovation process. 
 
Given the curvilinear effect, we then hypothesized that the acquirer’s capabilities in 
active learning (by internal R&D) and in passive learning (by acquisition experience) of the 
acquiring firms can alter the shape of the curvilinear relationship, by influencing two 
properties of the inverted-U curve: (i) the vertex, which identifies the level of industry 
relatedness maximizing post-acquisition innovative performance and (ii) the focal-length, 
which measures the size of the potential losses in post-acquisition innovative performance 
that would be incurred if industry relatedness is not at the optimal level. Our findings lead to 
two conclusions. First, capabilities in both active and passive learning exert a similar first-
order moderating effect, shifting the vertex of the inverted-U towards lower industry 
relatedness. This finding suggests that learning capabilities enhance the integration potential 
of an acquisition and enable acquirers to exploit the novelty potential of less industry-related 
acquisitions. Sears and Hoetker (2014) point out to the existence of an interdependence 
between technological relatedness and technological capabilities (i.e quantity and quality of 
patents), which can be attributed to an absorptive capacity mechanism, with a monotonic 
effect on the financial outcomes of acquisitions. Our study extends this approach, and 
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and value creation depends on in-house R&D investments and acquisition experience, which 
reflect the acquirer’s absorptive capacity.  
Second, our results show that capabilities in active and passive learning have an 
opposite second-order moderating effect on the inverted-U. While capabilities in active 
learning increase the focal length, leading to a flatter curve, capabilities in passive learning 
decreases the focal length, producing a narrower curve. These results suggest that in a 
situation in which industry relatedness departs from the optimal level, active learning 
capabilities enhance the re-combinatorial potential of the acquisition, reducing the potential 
losses in innovative performance with respect to the maximum achievable. Conversely, 
passive learning capabilities may create rigidities around established routines, which increase 
potential losses. 
Overall, our study contributes to M&A research by investigating interdependent 
effects in M&As (King et al., 2004), with a focus on learning capabilities and resource 
configurations (Sirmon et al., 2007). It also offers more general conclusions on exploration 
and exploitation in organizational search. Because acquisitions are a form of external search 
strategy, our results identify factors that can change the properties of the trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation in organizational search implied by the inverted-U (Lavie et al., 
2010). In particular, they shed further light on the distinction between weak and strong 
dynamic capabilities in organizational learning research (Levitt and March, 1988; Ng, 2007; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002). Both weak and strong learning capabilities enhance absorptive 
capacity facilitating integration between internal and external search, thus shifting the 
coordinates of the trade-off. Instead, they exert opposite effects on the tolerance of the trade-
off. Strong capabilities, outcome of learning by internal search, can lower the adverse effects 
of over-exploitation and over-exploration in external search (increasing tolerance). 
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risk of a competency trap (Hayward, 2002) when exploration and exploitation efforts are not 
well balanced (decreasing tolerance).   
Our results are robust when comparing two indicators of post-acquisition innovative 
performance, the sales of new-to-the-firm products and the sales of new-to-the-market 
products. Some differences also emerge. For new-to-market products, the level of innovative 
performance achieved at the optimal level of industry relatedness is higher than for new-to-
the-firm products, but the tolerance of the curve is lower. This indicates that acquisitions can 
be more beneficial for innovation in new-to-the market products but at greater risk when 
failing to reach a balance between the novelty of the acquired resources, and their effective 
integration, possibly because of the uncertainty of innovating in more novel products. 
Although we do not elaborate on this aspect, the results are suggestive of the potential of 
taking into account the novelty of the commercialized products in future M&A research on 
relatedness (Makri et al., 2010). Further research could also account for a more refined 
characterization of the motivations behind acquisitions since it is plausible that the 
importance of industry relatedness varies for different types of acquisitions. It is also possible 
that the effect of acquisition experience depends on the specific type of experience whether 
this concerns related or unrelated domains of activity. As well, more research could extend 
the attention from the acquirer to the heterogeneous capabilities of the acquired firm 
(Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). Finally, our study offers empirical evidence, based on the 
observation of the entire range of industrial sectors, of the existence of differences between 
high-tech and low-tech industries in the factors influencing post-acquisition innovative 
performance. This evidence can serve as a support to future studies who want to concentrate 
on either one and to explore the distinctive M&A dynamics of different technological 
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As earlier research points out, the managerial implications of the inverted U-shaped 
curve is that, in view of the existence of a trade-off between exploration and exploitation in 
acquisition search, firms should avoid targets that are either too unrelated or too closely 
related to them in their knowledge bases (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). By 
indicating firm-specific factors that can alter the shape of this trade-off, our study suggests 
possible paths for managerial decisions aimed at relaxing the structural boundaries imposed 
by the search of an optimally related partner. Especially in highly dynamic environments, 
when uncertainty surrounding innovation is high, managers are hardly able to anticipate what 
constitutes a ‘good target’ and to fully know what in-house expertise are required for post-
acquisition success, a priori (Jovanovic, 1982). At the same time, they are in the situation in 
which failing to choose an optimal acquisition target implies the greatest losses in terms of 
potential innovative performance post-acquisition. Our study points out that managers can 
mitigate this risk, by developing in-house capabilities in active learning, more than in passive 
learning, and that, by doing so, managers can enhance the organizational tolerance with 
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1 A curvilinear, inverted U-shaped, effect of technological relatedness is also observed for some dimensions of financial 
performance, such as the price paid by the acquirer for the target (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2014), but not for others, such as 
the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer’s stock (Sears and Hoetker, 2014). 
2 Ahuja and Katila (2001) measure the absolute size of the knowledge basis using the number of patents prior to the 
acquisition, observing however that this is highly correlated (0.89) with the yearly R&D expenditures. 
3 ABR stands for Algemeen Bedrijven Register. 
4 While earlier studies test for moderating effects to the curvilinear relationship, by assuming a linear specification of the 
moderator in the interaction with the square of relatedness, that is γZX2, in the equation of the parabola (Haans et al, 2015) 
we use a quadratic specification, that is γZ2X2, which maintains the symmetry in the way both components of the interaction 
term enter the equation. When expressing moderating effects of the first-order in the form of interaction terms, e.g. δZX, the 
moderator and the explanatory variable enter in the same manner, and the interpretation of the coefficient is symmetric. In 
other words, the coefficient δ measures the effect of X conditional on Z, as well as the effect of Z conditional on X. Hence, 
the reason to transform both variable in their squares is to maintain the same type of symmetry in the interpretation of the 
coefficient γ also for the second-order moderating effects. This is equivalent to assume the possibility that the moderators 
affect the dependent variable in a non-linear relationship, as it has been observed for R&D expenditures and post-acquisition 
patenting (Cloodt et al., 2006) and for acquisition experience and post-acquisition performance (Barkema and Schijven, 
2008). 
5 The results are available on request. 
6 The shift in the parabola towards the left-hand side with increasing R&D is confirmed also by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient in the model with only the linear interaction terms, holding constant the curvature or focal length of 
the curvilinear relationship 
7 The shift in the parabola towards the left-hand side with increasing acquisition experience is confirmed also by the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient in the model with only the linear interaction terms, holding constant the 
curvature or focal length of the curvilinear relationship.
 
8 Tables VIa and VIb contain the estimates for new-to-firm innovative sales, as dependent variable, only. The results for 
new-to-market innovative sales are largely robust, and are available upon request.  
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Table I.  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. 
Variable Mean  St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. New-to-firm innovation sales  7.42 3.06 1
2. New-to-market innovation sales  7.68 2.65 0.79 1
3. Relatedness 3.74 1.17 -0.09 -0.13 1
4. Acquisition experience 1.55 1.23 0.1 0.04 0.10 1
9. R&D intensity 1.68 2.87 0.26 0.27 -0.13 -0.5 1
5. Acquirer age 2.31 1.28 0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.05 1
6. Acquirer size 5.77 1.16 0.28 0.29 0.04 0.49 0.19 0.06 1
7. Target age 1.94 1.18 0.00 0.07 0.16 -0.1 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 1
8. Target size 2.35 1.82 0.09 0.13 0.24 -0.26 0.05 -0.2 0.12 0.41 1
10. Financial constraints 0.16 0.36 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.07 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 0.04 1
11. Lack of knowledge 0.29 0.45 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.24 -0.1 0.1 0.02 0.05 0.44 1
12. Market uncertainty 0.22 0.41 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.26 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.45 0.59 1
13. Acquirer high tech manuf. 0.05 0.22 0.05 -0.02 -0.13 -0.16 0.19 0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.00 1
14. Acquirer low tech manuf. 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.03 -0.08 -0.23 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.09 1
15. Acquirer high KI services 0.25 0.43 -0.10 -0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.18 -0.1 0.00 -0.16 -0.12 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.23 1
16. Acquirer low KI services 0.41 0.49 0.00 -0.02 0.16 0.15 -0.37 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.2 -0.33 -0.49 1
17. Acquirer construction 0.13 0.34 -0.07 0.16 -0.09 0.13 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.13 -0.09 -0.16 -0.24 -0.34 1
18. Target high tech manuf. 0.03 0.18 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.1 0.15 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.1 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.52 -0.01 -0.11 -0.11 -0.03 1
19. Target low tech manuf. 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.05 0.1 -0.19 0.13 -0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.62 -0.17 -0.2 -0.09 -0.05 1
20. Target high KI services 0.42 0.49 -0.05 -0.01 0.34 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.26 -0.28 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.1 -0.1 0.64 -0.48 0.04 -0.16 -0.25 1
21. Target low KI services 0.39 0.48 0.04 -0.03 0.24 0.1 -0.24 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.1 -0.06 -0.2 -0.44 0.75 -0.27 -0.15 -0.24 -0.69 1
22. Target construction 0.07 0.25 -0.01 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.21 0.56 -0.05 -0.08 -0.23 -0.22
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Total % Innovator 
  
High tech manufacturing 50 92 0.54 
Low tech manufacturing 129 237 0.54 
High Knowledge intensive service 168 448 0.38 
Low knowledge intensive service 95 717 0.13 
Construction 70 242 0.29 




Table III: Estimates of selection equation for post-acquisition innovation 
 
 




New to the firm New to the market 
          
Financial constraints   -0.378***   -0.316** 
    (0.117)   (0.128) 
Lack of knowledge   0.563***   0.409*** 
    (0.108)   (0.121) 
Market uncertainty   0.663***   0.700*** 
    (0.111)   (0.122) 
Acquirer age   -0.029   -0.069** 
    (0.031)   (0.034) 
Acquirer size   0.110***   0.140*** 
    (0.032)   (0.035) 
          
Time dummies   yes   yes 
          
Sector dummies   yes   yes 
        
Constant   -0.382   -0.735** 
    (0.311)   (0.349) 
          
LR χ2 (20)   404.85   319.39 
Pseudo R2   0.204    0.197 
Log-likelihood    -792.010    -684.765  
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Table IV. Estimates of performance equation for post-acquisition new-to-the-firm and new-
to-the-market innovation sales  
 
  NEW FIRM NEW FIRM NEW FIRM NEW MKT NEW MKT NEW MKT 
VARIABLES mod.1 mod.2 mod.3  mod.1a mod.2a mod.3a 
Innovative sales (t-1) 0.0716** 0.113*** 0.0975*** 0.0191 0.0752** 0.0475 
(0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0352) (0.0368) (0.0361) (0.0341) 
Relatedness (ln) 3.044** 3.236*** 1.488 5.546*** 5.314*** 3.159*** 
(1.202) (1.165) (1.241) (1.097) (1.042) (1.112) 
Relatedness2 (ln)2  -0.472*** -0.458*** -0.185 -0.855*** -0.782*** -0.427*** 
(0.172) (0.167) (0.172) (0.157) (0.150) (0.154) 
Acquisition experience (ln) -0.929** -0.650 -3.364*** -0.271 -0.0354 -2.539** 
(0.407) (0.397) (1.242) (0.383) (0.365) (1.134) 
Acquisition experience2 (ln)2 0.343** 0.246* 1.128*** 0.0781 -0.00534 0.873*** 
(0.140) (0.136) (0.263) (0.130) (0.124) (0.237) 
R&D intensity (ln) 0.160*** 0.658*** 0.663*** 0.126*** 0.554*** 0.598*** 
(0.0494) (0.137) (0.133) (0.0473) (0.122) (0.115) 
Relatedness x R&D intensity -0.310*** -0.305*** -0.291*** -0.294*** 
(0.0567) (0.0550) (0.0511) (0.0480) 
(Relatedness x R&D intensity) 2 0.00553*** 0.00556*** 0.00539*** 0.00542*** 
(0.000985) (0.000957) (0.000868) (0.000817) 
Relatedness x Acquisition experience 0.736** 0.699** 
(0.322) (0.295) 
(Relatedness x Acquisition experience) 2 -0.0597*** -0.0621*** 
(0.0154) (0.0143) 
 
Target age (ln) 0.101 0.0869 0.0553 0.0296 0.0421 -0.00731 
  (0.118) (0.114) (0.111) (0.112) (0.106) (0.100) 
Target size (ln) 0.0149 -0.0372 -0.0567 0.163** 0.0869 0.0480 
(0.0808) (0.0787) (0.0769) (0.0742) (0.0716) (0.0680) 
Acquirer age (ln) -0.0385 -0.0262 -0.0775 -0.167 -0.113 -0.202** 
  (0.113) (0.109) (0.107) (0.108) (0.103) (0.0986) 
Acquirer size (ln) 0.904*** 0.670*** 0.720*** 0.625*** 0.411*** 0.507*** 
(0.139) (0.143) (0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (0.132) 
Dummies for technological regimes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies (form 1997 til 2004) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -4.598** -3.729* -1.618 -4.141** -2.975 -0.945 
(2.261) (2.240) (2.419) (2.104) (2.042) (2.150) 
Mills (λ) 1.445*** 1.329*** 1.538*** 0.488 0.541 0.919** 
(0.438) (0.423) (0.417) (0.396) (0.377) (0.367) 
Wald χ2 153.1 196.9 238.1  234.4 298.9 382.0 
Rho 0.498 0.477 0.553  0.233 0.270 0.465 
Note: N = 1,736. Uncensored observations for NEW to the FIRM models = 512. Uncensored observations for NEW to the MARKET 
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Table V. Parameters of the curvilinear relationship of post-acquisition new-to-the-firm and 
new-to-the-market innovation sales and industry relatedness 
 















Direct effects (mod.1 and 1a) 3.22 5.85 0.53  3.24 8.64 0.29 
Moderating effects (mod.3 and 3a)      
R&D intensity       
Low 2.88 5.33 1.48  3.24 7.42 0.61 
High 1.64 5.56 2.30  2.93 7.36 0.71 
Acquisition experience        
Low 4.51 5.40 1.31  3.90 7.23 0.58 
High 2.72 6.70 0.38  2.81 8.23 0.27 
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Table VIa. Robustness analysis: estimates of performance equation for post-acquisition new-









NEW MKT NEW MKT
VARIABLES mod.1 mod.2 mod.3  mod.1a mod.2a mod.3a 
Innovative sales (t-1) -0.0306 0.0311 -0.00380 -0.0115 0.0775 0.0162 
(0.0545) (0.0543) (0.0501) (0.0529) (0.0498) (0.0450) 
Relatedness (ln) 4.561*** 3.866*** -0.832 7.467*** 6.887*** 1.720 
(1.446) (1.397) (1.527) (1.274) (1.160) (1.242) 
Relatedness2 (ln)2  -0.755*** -0.603*** 0.112 -1.142*** -1.016*** -0.258 
(0.209) (0.205) (0.216) (0.184) (0.170) (0.176) 
Acquisition experience (ln) -0.776 -0.177 -5.568*** -0.374 0.313 -5.554*** 
(0.581) (0.574) (1.546) (0.534) (0.498) (1.316) 
Acquisition experience2 (ln)2 0.295 0.0827 1.541*** 0.163 -0.116 1.348*** 
(0.205) (0.202) (0.322) (0.183) (0.172) (0.271) 
R&D intensity (ln) 0.180** 0.635*** 0.686*** 0.105 0.449*** 0.534*** 
(0.0721) (0.197) (0.181) (0.0670) (0.161) (0.142) 
Relatedness x R&D intensity -0.325*** -0.342*** -0.313*** -0.340*** 
(0.0820) (0.0758) (0.0678) (0.0590) 
(Relatedness x R&D intensity) 2 0.00624*** 0.00662*** 0.00671*** 0.00734***
(0.00131) (0.00122) (0.00104) (0.000924) 
Relatedness x Acquisition experience 1.634*** 1.736*** 
(0.431) (0.360) 
(Relatedness x Acquisition experience) 2 -0.118*** -0.114*** 
(0.0212) (0.0176) 
Target age (ln) 0.254 0.247 0.0996 0.301** 0.263* 0.192 
  (0.171) (0.164) (0.152) (0.149) (0.136) (0.119) 
Target size (ln) 0.0703 -0.0229 -0.0994 0.143 0.0263 -0.0629 
(0.113) (0.110) (0.102) (0.0988) (0.0913) (0.0810) 
Acquirer age (ln) 0.0960 0.143 -0.0455 -0.148 -0.0732 -0.186 
  (0.172) (0.165) (0.155) (0.163) (0.148) (0.134) 
Acquirer size (ln) 0.834*** 0.631*** 0.727*** 0.818*** 0.525*** 0.672*** 
(0.195) (0.193) (0.178) (0.188) (0.176) (0.159) 
Dummies for technological regimes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies (form 1997 til 2004) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -6.410** -4.508 2.432 -8.364*** -5.484** 1.294 
(2.795) (2.751) (3.021) (2.529) (2.337) (2.472) 
Mills (λ) 1.673*** 1.513*** 1.463*** 1.236*** 1.030** 1.370*** 
(0.522) (0.501) (0.461) (0.459) (0.414) (0.379) 
Wald χ2 104.1 135.9 210.0 144.3 219.5 329.9 
Rho 0.577 0.550 0.575 0.569 0.532 0.730 
Note: N = 719 for New-to-the-firm. N=645 for New-to-the-market. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05, *** p 
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Table VIb. Robustness analysis: estimates of performance equation for post-acquisition new-
to-firm and new-to-the-market innovation sales, in Low-tech 
 
  NEW FIRM NEW FIRM NEW FIRM NEW MKT NEW MKT NEW MKT 
VARIABLES mod.1 mod.2 mod.3  mod.1a mod.2a mod.3a 
Innovative sales (t-1) 0.183*** 0.174*** 0.168*** 0.151*** 0.130*** 0.125** 
(0.0476) (0.0486) (0.0489) (0.0499) (0.0496) (0.0487) 
Relatedness (ln) -2.678 -2.676 -2.392 1.064 0.996 0.758 
(2.054) (2.065) (2.114) (1.952) (1.907) (1.910) 
Relatedness2 (ln)2  0.389 0.417 0.398 -0.167 -0.107 -0.0408 
(0.290) (0.291) (0.293) (0.276) (0.270) (0.267) 
Acquisition experience (ln) -1.208** -1.180** -0.986 -0.573 -0.615 -2.298 
(0.586) (0.586) (1.952) (0.580) (0.575) (1.801) 
Acquisition experience2 (ln)2 0.602*** 0.614*** 0.688 0.178 0.228 0.719* 
(0.232) (0.233) (0.427) (0.229) (0.228) (0.390) 
R&D intensity (ln) 0.235*** 0.564*** 0.616*** 0.0926 0.532*** 0.703*** 
(0.0657) (0.201) (0.206) (0.0686) (0.189) (0.201) 
Relatedness x R&D intensity -0.102 -0.122 -0.0945 -0.164** 
(0.0847) (0.0867) (0.0796) (0.0837) 
(Relatedness x R&D intensity) 2 0.000423 0.000688 -0.000946 -0.000257 
(0.00160) (0.00162) (0.00154) (0.00154) 
Relatedness x Acquisition experience -0.0145 0.563 
(0.511) (0.482) 
(Relatedness x Acquisition experience) 2 -0.00937 -0.0480* 
(0.0275) (0.0268) 
Target age (ln) -0.0556 -0.0183 -0.0168 -0.226 -0.159 -0.141 
  (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.159) (0.159) (0.157) 
Target size (ln) -0.103 -0.113 -0.1000 0.130 0.0994 0.104 
(0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.112) (0.111) 
Acquirer age (ln) -0.314** -0.303** -0.305** -0.390*** -0.367** -0.414*** 
  (0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148) (0.144) (0.144) 
Acquirer size (ln) 0.498** 0.483** 0.519** 0.508** 0.605** 0.708*** 
(0.196) (0.218) (0.220) (0.219) (0.236) (0.235) 
Dummies for technological regimes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies (form 1997 til 2004) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 7.137* 6.728* 5.784 3.138 1.609 1.122 
(3.674) (3.655) (3.846) (3.639) (3.573) (3.663) 
Mills (λ) 0.691 0.646 0.623 0.398 0.408 0.369 
(0.600) (0.596) (0.604) (0.416) (0.410) (0.402) 
Wald χ2 131.7 137.3 139.2  178.2 198.3 212.2 
Rho 0.306 0.289 0.280  0.222 0.234 0.217 
Note: N = 744 for New-to-the-firm. N=684 for New-to-the-market. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05, *** p 
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Table VII. Robustness analysis: GMM estimator with lagged innovative sales instrumented.  
  NEW FIRM NEW FIRM NEW FIRM   NEW MKT NEW MKT NEW MKT 
VARIABLES mod.1  mod.2 mod.3   mod.1a  mod.2a mod.3a 
Innovative sales (t-1) 0.0518 0.0925** 0.0776** 0.0343 0.106*** 0.0833** 
(0.0382) (0.0372) (0.0368) (0.0425) (0.0394) (0.0362) 
Relatedness (ln) 2.538* 2.890** 2.206 4.867*** 4.941*** 3.758*** 
(1.514) (1.425) (1.491) (1.308) (1.204) (1.233)
Relatedness2 (ln)2  -0.379* -0.399** -0.273 -0.751*** -0.736*** -0.529*** 
(0.213) (0.200) (0.204) (0.186) (0.171) (0.169) 
Acquisition experience (ln) -0.962** -0.722* -2.712** -0.367 -0.123 -2.094** 
(0.384) (0.396) (1.266) (0.372) (0.362) (1.011) 
Acquisition experience2 (ln)2 0.363*** 0.271* 0.936*** 0.119 0.0180 0.725*** 
(0.137) (0.142) (0.265) (0.127) (0.128) (0.207)
R&D intensity (ln) 0.171*** 0.599*** 0.666*** 0.0940* 0.421*** 0.489*** 
(0.0428) (0.139) (0.142) (0.0555) (0.119) (0.120) 
Relatedness x R&D intensity -0.276*** -0.299*** -0.260*** -0.272*** 
(0.0596) (0.0562) (0.0505) (0.0481) 
(Relatedness x R&D intensity) 2 0.00501*** 0.00536*** 0.00515*** 0.00520*** 
(0.00113) (0.000961) (0.000977) (0.000799)
Relatedness x Acquisition experience 0.592* 0.597** 
(0.336) (0.275) 
(Relatedness x Acquisition experience) 2 -0.0516*** -0.0549*** 
(0.0165) (0.0141) 
Target age (ln) 0.122 0.120 0.112 0.0873 0.0875 0.0299
  (0.114) (0.110) (0.110) (0.102) (0.101) (0.100)
Target size (ln) -0.0155 -0.0467 -0.0501 0.134** 0.0566 0.0545 
(0.0755) (0.0757) (0.0753) (0.0614) (0.0612) (0.0624) 
Acquirer age (ln) -0.134 -0.0826 -0.145 -0.137 -0.0722 -0.180* 
  (0.111) (0.108) (0.104) (0.107) (0.108) (0.101) 
Acquirer size (ln) 0.745*** 0.577*** 0.587*** 0.574*** 0.344** 0.377***
(0.121) (0.128) (0.125) (0.136) (0.139) (0.128) 
Dummies for technological regimes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies (form 1997 til 2004)  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.695 -0.633 0.0858 -2.225 -1.221 0.116 
(2.602) (2.463) (2.679) (2.271) (2.084) (2.283) 
Observations 512 512 512   362 362 362 
Hansen-Sargan J statistic 21.76 23.16 25.31 14.85 17.29 17.88 
J statistics χ2 (8) p-value 0.0054 0.0031 0.0014 0.0621 0.0272 0.0222 
R2 0.208 0.263 0.303   0.387 0.442 0.506 
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Figure 1a: New to firm






















Figure 1b: New to market
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Figure 2a: New to firm























Figure 2b: New to market
High experience Low experience
